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LEADING BY EXAMPLE: WHY THE FIRST
CIRCUIT SHOULD ADOPT A MEDICAL PEERREVIEW PRIVILEGE
INTRODUCTION
Suppose you represent a hospital in Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, or Rhode Island. You assist your client in developing policies
and procedures that help the hospital provide the highest quality of patient
care. You are familiar with the peer-review process, a mechanism whereby
a professional review body evaluates the soundness of a physician's
medical decisions in any given situation.
One hurried morning, your client calls about a recent emergency
room incident and a subsequent determination by the hospital's peer-review
committee not to dismiss the physician involved. The hospital is concerned
about a possible malpractice lawsuit and that the information discussed in
the peer-review meeting could expose the hospital and physician to
liability. Although your client wants to know whether the peer-review
information would be disclosed during litigation, the answer is unclear and
may depend on the forum-state or federal-in which the action is
brought. In a state court, the outcome is more predictable because the
judge simply must decide whether the state's medical peer-review statute
protects the specific requested information from discovery. However, the
applicable law that governs a federal court's analysis is determined by the
court's jurisdiction-diversity or federal question-and, if it is the latter,
then supplemental state law claims impact whether the federal court might
recognize a medical peer-review evidentiary privilege.
One example of a federal court resolving the issue is a 2009 case
from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, in
which the court held that the state's peer-review statute should apply and
the peer-review information a plaintiff requested from a hospital was
privileged because the information did not support her federal law claim.'
In Bennett v. Kent County Memorial Hospital,2 the plaintiff brought state
negligence claims and federal claims under the Emergency Medical
I

See Bennett v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 246, 255 (D.R.I. 2009)

(discussing court's reasoning for denying plaintiffs motion to compel evidence); see also infra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text (reviewing Bennett).
2 623 F. Supp. 2d 246.
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Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), arguing that the hospital
failed to provide appropriate medical tests and to stabilize her mother while
receiving emergency care.3 The defendant objected to answering questions
during a deposition regarding peer-review discussions. 4 The court allowed
the defendant to assert the state's medical peer-review privilege; the
statute's confidentiality provision persuaded the court that such
confidentiality was necessary for an effective peer-review process.5 The
court noted, however, that the "issue of what privilege law should apply in
federal question cases with supplemental state law claims remains
unresolved.", 6 Under different circumstances,
some district courts have
7
refused to recognize the privilege.
The unpredictability of whether federal courts will apply the state
law privilege highlights the dilemma that hospitals, physicians, and other
healthcare providers face when performing peer review and trying to
protect confidentiality.8 This uncertainty is only exacerbated by the fact
that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have legislatively enacted
some form of a medical peer-review privilege. 9 Consensus among the
states indicates that the privilege's purpose-to improve healthcare quality
and risk management by encouraging open discussion among physiciansserves important public interests.
Congress echoed this sentiment when it
3 Id. at 247-48; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) (requiring hospital emergency
department to provide appropriate medical screening examination).
4 Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
5 Id. at 255 (stating non-recognition of the privilege would jeopardize integrity
of the
process). "Reporting systems in health care facilities typically serve two core functions: to hold
providers accountable for their performance and, alternatively, to impart certain information that
will increase general safety in connection with medical care." David L. Fine, Note, The Afedical

Peer Review Privilege in Massachusetts:A Necessary Quality ControlMeasure or an Ineffective
Obstruction of Equitable Redress?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 811, 817-18 (2005).

6 Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53 (citing Guzman v. Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., No. H07-3973, 2009 WL 427268, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2009)).
7 See Krolikowski v. Univ. of Mass., 150 F. Supp. 2d 246, 248-49 (D. Mass. 2001) (stating
that in federal discrimination cases, courts typically do not recognize the state privilege); see also
Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Grp., 198 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Me. 2000) (finding hospital was unable to
assert state evidentiary privilege against disability discrimination claim).
8 See Susan 0. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer
Review Information: lore Imagined Than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 197 (1993) (discussing
healthcare facilities' confusion about whether federal courts will protect peer-review activities).
9 See Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. et al., A PracticalAnalysis of HCQIA Immunity, IN-HOUSE DEF.
Q. 34, 35 (Fall 2009) (noting all states and District of Columbia have statutes protecting peerreview activities).
10 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) (emphasizing states' policy decisions to
support federal recognition of such state privileges); see also Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 8, at
181-82 (describing how peer-review privilege is product of legislative creation rather than
common law). The fact that all fifty states decided to enact some form of a peer-review statute
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passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA"). 11
However, courts disagree about whether
HCQIA includes an evidentiary
12
privilege for peer-review materials.
This Note argues that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
should become the first circuit to recognize the medical peer-review
privilege in cases that include federal and state claims. 3 Doing so would
settle the open question of whether this state privilege applies to a federal
claim, a question over which district courts are split. 14

Because the

Supreme Court has not addressed whether this privilege exists under
federal law, courts in the First Circuit are forced to balance the policy
interests that the privilege promotes against the probative value of the
evidence sought to be admitted on a case-by-case basis.'5
Part I of this Note provides the common elements of medical peerreview statutes and subsequently compares those laws of the First Circuit
states. 6 Part II outlines discovery rules, HCQIA, and how federal courts
decide whether to apply a state privilege invoked against a federal claim. 17
indicates a similar belief among the legislatures that the public benefits from the protection of
medical peer-review participants and information. See Ghazal Sharifi, Comment, Is the Door
Open or Closed? Evaluating the Future of the FederalAfedical Peer-Review Privilege, 42 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 561, 572 (2009) (raising concerns that would result from absence of such
peer-review privileges).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5) (2006) ("There is an overriding national need to provide
incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.").
12 See Sharifi, supra note 10, at 566-67 (noting inconsistent treatment of peer-review
materials during discovery). Under HCQIA, peer-review participants are granted only immunity,
whereas the state laws extend a privilege to the discoverability and admissibility of evidence and
protect confidentiality of the peer-review information. Id. at 565, 571.
13 See Bennett v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 (D.R.I. 2009) (stating
First Circuit has not considered the issue); see also Sharifi, supra note 10, at 571-72 (noting
Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have not recognized this federal privilege).
14 See In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass.,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386,
389 (D. Mass. 2005) (stating no court in the First Circuit has recognized a federal medical peerreview privilege); cf Murphy v. United States, No. 06-CV-459-JD, 2008 WL 2568177, at *2
(D.N.H. June 25, 2008) (finding existence of federal quality assurance review privilege).
15 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-12 (defining common law testimonial privilege); see also Lisa M.
Nijm, Article, Pitfalls ofPeer Review: The Limited Protectionsof State and FederalPeer Review
Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 555 (2003) (describing how federal courts use a
balancing test). Federal Rule of Evidence 501 authorizes courts to use "reason and experience" in
determining whether to establish a common-law privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 501. In Jaffee, the
Court stated the issue as: "whether a privilege protecting confidential communications . . .
'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence ....' 518
U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
16 See infra Part I.
17 See infra Part II;
see also Alissa Marie Bassler, Comment, FederalLaw Should Keep Pace
With States and Recognize A Afedical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 691 (2003)
("Currently, federal courts ... are not applying the [medical peer-review] privilege to either the
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Part II also reviews recent First Circuit district court cases that have both
recognized and refused to recognize the privilege, and specifically explores
the First Circuit's Hampers test.'
Part III discusses the First Circuit's
position in relation to its sister circuits, provides suggestions as to how the
First Circuit could formulate a federal common law medical peer-review
privilege, and, alternatively, proposes congressional action.' 9
I.

HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE

In the healthcare industry, peer review is the process by which
groups or committees of physicians review their colleagues' work. 20 The
system provides a critical tool for evaluating physicians' credentials to
practice in the hospital, improving their ongoing care through routine
assessments, and determining whether to take action after specific quality
concerns arise. 2 1
Because the process requires participation from
healthcare professionals within an organization that are qualified to
examine their peers, it is likely to create difficult conflicts among coworkers.22 For instance, participants are concerned about the competing
interests of some groups' efforts to obtain peer-review information, such as
by plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case, insurance companies making

federal claims or the state claims [when both state claims and a federal question are presented].").
18 See infra Part II.C (outlining test from In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1981)). In
the First Circuit, district courts use a two-part test for recognizing a state evidentiary privilege:
(1) whether the forum state would grant the privilege asserted; and (2) whether the privilege is
'intrinsically meritorious." See Hampers, 651 F.2d at 22 (citing ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336,
1343 (5th Cir. 1981)).
19 See infra Part 11.
20
ledical Peer Review, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/legal-topics/medical-peer-review.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (describing peer
review).
21 See Fine, supra note 5, at 811-13 (discussing how peer-review activities can reduce
medical error); see also Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597, 600 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (arguing peer review serves several important purposes). The evaluative practice helps to
root out incompetence in the profession, leading to a higher overall level of health care for
patients. Nilavar, 210 F.R.D. at 600. It also reassures patients they are receiving proper care
when they learn that the institution takes time to review its policies, procedures, and physicians'
conduct. Id. But see Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing

Afedical Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (2006) (noting critics allege
peer review does not actually adequately improve healthcare quality and safety).
22 See Nijm, supra note 15, at 545-46 (outlining potential uses of peer-review information).
Individuals performing the review may feel comfortable sanctioning a physician in private, such
as by requiring additional training, but fear of subsequent lawsuits by this physician or by her
patients can impede whether the peer review is effective. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 8,
at 174 (discussing concerns of peer-review participants).
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payment decisions, or other healthcare providers making referrals. 23 To
foster candid discussion in medical peer reviews, state legislatures enacted
laws to protect the peer-review proceedings and materials.2 4
A.

Medical Peer-Review Statutes of the First Circuit

The American Medical Association and scholars explain that goodfaith peer review is afforded protection in some combination of the
following three ways: (1) "involved individuals and institutions are
granted immunity from lawsuits"; (2) "information related to the peer
review process is deemed confidential"; and (3) "peer review work product
is designated privileged and inadmissible in court., 25 All states within the
First Circuit have statutes providing some form of immunity,
confidentiality, and an evidentiary privilege to medical peer reviews.26 In
23

why).

See Nijm, supra note 15, at 545-46 (describing who seeks peer-review information and

24 See Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 857-59 (R.I. 1991) (characterizing legislative intent
behind Rhode Island's peer-review statute). There is an "overwhelming public interest" in
protecting the confidentiality of peer-review meetings because doctors make life and death
decisions every day, and must have access to the most up-to-date information and techniques,
which is garnered through the free flow of ideas and advice. See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc.,
50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970) (announcing federal peer-review privilege). But see Syposs v.
United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (arguing court's creation of a peerreview privilege in Bredice was dicta). Furthermore, the privilege and immunity provided by
these state statutes curbs malpractice litigation, which trickles down to lower healthcare costs for
the consumer because institutions consider the litigation expenses in determining pricing. See
Saunders v. Tisher, 902 A.2d 830, 834 (Me. 2006) (describing legislative intent of Maine's
Health Security Act); see also Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Mass. 2007)
(noting Massachusetts "provide[s] weighty protection to a medical peer review committee's work
product and materials").
25 Medical Peer Review, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/legal-topics/medical-peer-review.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) (listing legal
protections for peer reviews); see Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost
but no Benefit Is it Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 27 (1999) (outlining how
medical peer-review statutes may provide three types of protection: privilege, confidentiality,
and immunity).
26 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2510-A, 2511 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, §§
204-05 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:13-a (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-37.3-7, 23-17-25
(2009). New Hampshire's medical peer-review statute includes an example of immunity: "No
hospital, trustees, medical staff, employees, or other committee attendees shall be held liable in
any action for damages or other relief arising from the providing of information to a hospital
committee or in any judicial or administrative proceeding." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151:13a(IV). Rhode Island's statute provides an example of confidentiality language and reads, in part:
"Confidential health care information before a medical peer review board shall remain strictly
confidential, and any person found guilty of the unlawful disclosure of that information shall be
subject to the penalties .... " R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-7(b). The privilege in Maine's statute
stipulates that: "[A] 11professional competence review records are privileged and confidential and
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general, states that mention confidentiality do so in conjunction with
granting a privilege, suggesting that this confidentiality language applies
only in the judicial context rather than to any actual requirement that
participants keep the information confidential. 27 Of the four First Circuit
states, only Rhode Island provides sanctions for peer review participants
that do not abide by the confidentiality language .28
The immunity
provisions stipulate immunity from suit, damages, or both.29
II.

FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR THE MEDICAL PEER-REVIEW
PRIVILEGE

Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("Rule 501") governs the use of
privilege in federal litigation.30 Rule 501 provides that federal courts
follow common law where a plaintiff or defendant raises an issue of federal
law and a privilege is asserted. 3' In civil suits, where the federal court has
diversity jurisdiction, the state law from the forum state should supply the
rules for privileges. 3 2 For example, one federal district court in the Eighth

are not subject to discovery, subpoena or other means of legal compulsion for their release to any
person or entity and are not admissible as evidence in any civil, judicial or administrative
proceeding." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2510-A.
27 See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 8, at 193-95; see also Christina A. Graham, Comment,
Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the State and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30
CuMB. L. REV. 111, 125 (2000) (explaining discrepancy amongst state statutes regarding degree
of protection provided for peer-review documents). For example, the Massachusetts peer-review
statute reads, in part:
[T]he proceedings, reports and records of a medical peer review committee shall be
confidential and ... shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery, or introduced into
evidence, in any judicial or administrative proceeding, except proceedings held by the
boards of registration in medicine, pharmacy, social work, or psychology or by the
department of public health.., and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of a
medical peer review committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such
judicial or administrative proceeding ... as to the proceedings of such committee or as
to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, deliberations or other actions
of such committee or any members thereof.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204(a) (2003).
28 See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 8, at 194-95 (arguing Rhode Island is one of a few
states that fully appreciates concept of confidentiality). See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3
(2009) (establishing safeguards for maintaining confidential healthcare information).
29 Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 8, at 176 (noting range of immunity varies by statute).
30 See FED. R. EVID. 501.
31 Id. Rule 501 reads in part: "[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id.
32 Id. Section 1332, title 28 of the United States Code governs diversity jurisdiction. 28
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Circuit applied the forum state's medical peer-review statute to preclude
from discovery certain documents relating to the patient's care because the
parties were diverse.33 Whether in state court, or federal court pursuant to
diversity of citizenship, the plain language of the state's peer-review statute
will supply the rules for the court to apply. 34
A.

The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQA ")

In cases based on federal question jurisdiction, federal courts use
their own judgment when considering an evidentiary privilege and are not
bound by any specific state laws. 35 As expressed in Rule 501, the
Constitution, federal statutes, and Supreme Court precedent should guide
courts in determining whether there is a common-law privilege. 36 Without
any constitutional protection or Supreme Court cases on point, courts have

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
• . . between . . . citizens of different States .... "). "[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. EVID. 501; cf Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (holding federal courts cannot create common law when hearing state law
claims under diversity jurisdiction). The rule for broad discovery states: "Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense...
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
33 See generally Uhing v. Callahan, No. 08 Civ. 4200, 2010 WL 23059, at *8 (D.S.D. Jan. 4,
2010) (relying on South Dakota's medical peer-review privilege to deny plaintiffs' motions to
compel peer-review documents). The United States District Court for the District of South
Dakota determined that the "plain language" of the state privilege controlled whether ten disputed
documents were subject to discovery. Id. Comparing each set of documents' description to the
definition of peer-review committee and activities, the court concluded that nine of the ten
documents were privileged under the state law. See id. at *4-7 (conducting "document-bydocument" analysis).
34 See Burrows v. Redbud Cmty. Hosp. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 606, 610-11 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(outlining Rule 501 analysis). "However, state law claims that are pendent to federal question
cases are governed by federal privilege law." Id. at 611.
35

See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §

501.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2009) (noting federal courts can establish new
privileges based on changing conditions); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) ("The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.").
36 FED. R. EVID. 501.
Some of the most recognized privileges are the attorney-client
privilege, psychotherapist-patient privilege, and marital privilege. See 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.07 (2009). The medical peerreview privilege is a state-developed law; it is characterized as an "institutional privilege"
because, when enacting such statutes, legislatures were motivated by the need to protect the
institution of health care, which relied on the peer-review process. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra
note 8, at 179-82 (describing development of peer-review privilege).
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looked to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 because it is
the only federal law that addresses medical peer review. 37
As opposed to state medical peer-review statutes that typically
include three distinct elements protecting the peer-review process, HCQIA
only provides immunity.38 Under HCQIA, when a "professional review
body" meets four statutory requirements, then its participants are immune
from damages.3 9 Congress was silent about any privilege for peer-review
proceedings under HCQIA, and courts presume that the legislature would
have addressed the issue if it intended to grant a specific evidentiary
privilege.40

Consequently, federal courts are left to adopt a privilege as a
matter of common law, if at all, and many courts have signaled reluctance
in doing So.14 For instance, in Syposs v. United States,42 the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York declined to extend the
forum state's medical peer-review privilege to a federal question case
arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 43 In that case, the
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(3)-(5) (2006); see also Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys., 537
F.3d 368,

369-70 (5th Cir. 2008) (reversing thirty-three million dollar judgment against defendant because
it was immune from damages), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009).
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2006); In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mass., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386, 390 (D. Mass. 2005) ("Congress extended qualified immunity
from suit to those conducting such peer reviews."); see also Nijm, supra note 15, at 550
(delineating HCQIA's elements); sources cited supra note 25 (listing protections afforded by state
statutes).
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(2).
[A] professional review action must be taken-(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved
or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such
reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).
42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2006). When applying the statute, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether the institution acted reasonably during the peer-review
process. See Hurney, Jr. et al., supra note 9, at 39-40, 59 (describing how an institution's peer
review effects HCQIA immunity protection).
40 See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 8, at 182 (finding little support for federal commonlaw peer-review privileges).
41 Compare Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (deciding
not to
recognize privilege in federal discrimination case), with Ming Wei Liu v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala., 330 F. App'x 775, 777, 779-80 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding use of privilege to withhold
credentialing information), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1053 (2010).
42 63 F. Supp. 2d 301 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
43 Id. at 308-09 (holding "neither reason nor experience" warranted a common law federal
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malpractice claim raised an issue of federal law because the surgeon
practiced at a Veterans Administration Hospital. 44 The court found that the
legislative history of HCQIA indicated Congress's explicit rejection of the
notion that strict confidentiality of peer reviews was necessary to promote
quality health care. 45 Additionally, the court rejected the comparison of the
medical peer-review privilege to the psychotherapist privilege delineated in
Jaffee v. Redmond 6 because the institutional prerogative of confidentiality
in peer reviews was not equivalent to the assurance that communications in
therapy remain confidential for a patient's effective care.47

peer-review privilege). But cf Smith ex rel. Smith v. United States, 193 F.R.D. 201, 208 (D. Del.
2000) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2006)) (finding medical quality assurance records were
privileged from discovery in medical malpractice suit under FTCA). In Syposs, two hospitals that
were not parties in a separate medical malpractice case were subpoenaed to compel peer-review
documents about a doctor whose surgery was the subject of the other suit. 63 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
44 See Syposs, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 302-03; see also Bethel v. U.S. ex rel. Veterans Admin.
Med. Ctr. of Denver, Colo., 242 F.R.D. 580, 584 (D. Colo. 2007) (refusing to apply "[a] blanket
claim of privilege"). The Colorado district court evaluated the medical quality -assurance records
to determine if they were privileged. Bethel, 242 F.R.D. at 584; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5705(a)
(2006) ("Records and documents created by the Department [of Veterans Affairs] as part of a
medical quality-assurance program ... are confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed
to any person or entity .... "). Section 5705 establishes a statutory privilege for documents
created by or for the Veterans Administration ("VA") as part of a medical quality -assurance
program. See § 5705. In Bethel, though, the court held that "root cause" analyses were not
protected by the VA's quality assurance privilege, neither were the "peer review" documents,
purported "morbidity and mortality reviews," and "drug usage evaluations," but a "patient safety
report" was protected. See 242 F.R.D. at 585-88. In addition to a VA privilege, "[m]ilitary
physicians who participate in peer review are given a broader range of privileges and immunities
by the Department of Defense than that provided under HCQIA." Teresa L. Salamon, When
Revoking Privilege Leads to Invoking Privilege: Whether There is a Need to Recognize a Clearly
Defined Aledical Peer Review Privilege in Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 47 VILL. L. REv. 643,
653 (2002). See generally 10 U.S.C. § 1102 (providing confidentiality of medical quality
assurance records).
45 Syposs, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 307. The court acknowledged that federal courts should consider
state laws when determining whether a new privilege is justified. Id. at 307-08; see also Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1996) (announcing psychotherapist privilege). However, the court
stated that this determination is only one factor of many, and federal courts in a federal question
case are not required to defer to state law. Syposs, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
46 518 U.S. 1, 5-7.
47 Syposs, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09. The court stated:
Physicians and hospitals have an overriding professional obligation and economic
incentive to improve the quality of medical care they provide thereby potentially
reducing malpractice insurance rates and improving profitability regardless of the
availability of strict confidentiality. Whatever degree of confidentiality may also be
needed to obtain participation in effective peer reviews can be provided by the
courts
Id. at 308.
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The Syposs court relied on University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,48
which is the only Supreme Court case that addresses a peer-review
privilege, and its context was academic peer review. 49 That case involved
an EEOC subpoena directed to the University of Pennsylvania for the
tenure-review files of a female professor who was denied tenure and those
records of similarly situated male faculty who received tenure.50 The Court
determined that the language in Title VII did not include a privilege for
educational institutions." Additionally, the Court was hesitant to establish
a common-law privilege where legislative intent and precedent
as well as a
52
lack of constitutional foundation did not support the decision.
B.
Analysis of the Medical Peer-Review Privilege by Circuit Courts of
Appeals
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the peer-review
privilege as it relates to the medical practice, a number of the federal circuit
courts of appeals have considered the issue, most recently in the Eleventh
Circuit.53 In Ming Wei Liu v. Board of Trustees of University ofAlabama,54
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling that the University of
Alabama, Birmingham ("UAB") was authorized by its state's peer-review
48

493 U.S. 182 (1990).

49 Syposs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (declining to adopt

new privilege for peer-review materials). In University of Pennsylvania, a female professor
brought a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 493 U.S. at 185.
50 See Univ. ofPa., 493 U.S. at 185.
51 Id. at 189-90. Title VII does "not carve out any special privilege relating to peer review
materials, despite the fact that Congress undoubtedly was aware, when it extended Title VII's
coverage, of the potential burden that access to such material might create." Id. at 191; see also
In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386, 390 (D.
Mass. 2005) (comparing absence of peer-review privilege in Civil Rights Act with HCQIA).
52 Univ. ofPa., 493 U.S. at 192-95. The Court conducted a historical analysis comparing the
reasoning for protecting confidentiality of presidential communications, for instance, against the
arguments supporting recognition of a peer-review privilege. Id. at 194-95.
53 See Ming Wei Liu v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 330 F. App'x 775, 778 (1 lth Cir. 2009)
(applying Alabama's state peer-review privilege to uphold defendant's refusal to provide
discovery material), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1053 (2010). The Fourth Circuit and Fifth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have also recently considered the applicability of state peer-review statutes to
federal claims, but these cases focused on immunity from damages under HCQIA. See Wahi v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 606-07 (4th Cir. 2009) (ruling hospital that
suspended physician's medical privileges without a prior hearing was immune from liability),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1140 (2010); Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368, 369-70 (5th Cir.
2008) (reversing thirty-three million dollar judgment against defendant because it was immune
from damages), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009).
54 330 F. App'x 775.
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statute to refuse sending certain material to another institution.5 5 The
plaintiff, Dr. Liu, was a cardiologist and tenured professor at UAB before
the university suspended his clinical privileges.1 6 The university began a
peer-review investigation, but Dr. Liu resigned prior to its completion;
shortly thereafter, he applied for a position at the University of Southern
California Hospital ("USC"), which requested peer-review information
from UAB to evaluate Dr. Liu's credentials. 5 7 The Eleventh Circuit held
that UAB's reliance on the state privilege was constitutional and did not
violate the Supremacy Clause because the Alabama law "as applied" did
not "thwart" the intent of HCQIA.58 The court of appeals reasoned that
HCQIA did not require UAB to provide more peer-review information to a
credentialing authority in another state than was mandated. '9
The Eleventh Circuit arrived at a different conclusion concerning a
healthcare entity's use of a state medical peer-review privilege in a federal
discrimination case. 60 In Adkins v. Christie,66i the plaintiff, an African55 See id. at 778-79.

In addition to his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection claims, Dr. Liu alleged that his former employer's refusal to provide the peer-review
information to a prospective employer "violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution by obstructing the 'essential purpose' of the HCQIA." Id. at 777.
56 See id. at 776-78 (laying out facts of claim).
57 See id. at 777. As required under HCQIA, "certain information relating to the professional
competence and conduct of physicians" is collected in a National Practitioner Data Bank
("NPDB"). See 45 C.F.R. § 60.1 (2005). The university reported Dr. Liu's resignation during the
peer-review investigation to the NPDB. Liu, 330 F. App'x at 777. Dr. Liu's prospective
employer, USC, wanted to inspect the peer-review report. Id. The director of cardiovascular
research at UAB did not offer USC the material, but "sent a 'recommendation letter' to USC
stating that Dr. Liu was placed on probation and was being investigated because his 'performed
procedures, planned procedures, certain aspects of medical care, and his hospital chart
documentation were not within the standard of care at [UAB]. "' Id. The court did not address
whether UAB's use of the privilege outside of the litigation context was appropriate because the
district court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the pending state law claims
after finding UAB's conduct did not violate any of Dr. Liu's federally protected rights. Id. at
777-78 & n.3.
58 Liu, 330 F. App'x at 779 (stating Alabama's peer-review privilege supplemented the
federal law). The court found that HCQIA did not preempt state law where the intent of both the
federal and state statutes was the same: to address an increasing amount of medical malpractice
claims, "'to facilitate the frank exchange of information among professionals conducting peer
review inquiries without the fear of reprisals in civil lawsuits,"' and to ensure some minimal
protection against incompetent doctors easily moving their practice from state to state. Id. at 77980 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318,
1322 (1lth Cir. 1994)).
59 See id. at 779 (concluding use of peer-review privilege is consistent with HCQIA); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(3) (2006) (requiring healthcare entities report certain information
about physicians when professional review actions are taken).
60 See Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (vacating district court's
grant of summary judgment because plaintiff was limited in conducting discovery).
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American physician who worked at the Houston Medical Center, alleged
that his employer terminated his privileges because of his race.62 The
district court limited Adkins's discovery request for documents relating to
the "peer review of all physicians at the hospital" during the years Adkins
was on staff because such material was privileged under Georgia law.63
The court of appeals agreed with the defendant's argument that the
privilege serves important interests, but ultimately concluded that the
evidentiary privilege was unwarranted in federal civil rights cases. 64 In
declining to recognize the state's medical peer-review privilege, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff sought documents critical to establishing his
65
claim of racial discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Adkins was persuaded by Fourth
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals' decisions.66 The Seventh Circuit
was the first to consider the privilege and, similar to the Eleventh Circuit,
concluded that the public interests in enforcing federal antitrust law were
"too strong to permit the exclusion of relevant and possibly crucial
evidence"; such a holding implies that the claim arose out of the peerreview process.67 In Virmani v. Novant Health Inc.,6 the Fourth Circuit
confronted the same federal discrimination issue as the Adkins court.69
61

488 F.3d 1324.

62

See id. at 1324-26 (setting out facts of claim). Adkins believed that his suspension and

subsequent termination was based on the recommendation of the hospital's peer review
committee, which conducted a biased and unfair evaluation. See id.
63 Id. at 1327.
64 See id. at 1328-29 (finding interest in civil rights cases outweighs privilege's public good).
The court weighed the interests for protecting evidence against the corresponding and overriding
goal that discovery is essential to determine whether employment discrimination has occurred.
See id.

65 See id. at 1329 (suggesting lack of discovery would prevent claim altogether).
The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the interests at issue in this type of case are different from those in a
malpractice case. Id. at 1330.
66 Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329-30 (supporting holding with cases from Fourth and Seventh
Circuits); see also Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 293 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying
privilege in federal discrimination case); Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry Cnty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d
1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting privilege in federal civil antitrust context).
67 See Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1063 (declining to recognize hospital's disciplinary proceedings
were privileged under Illinois's medical peer-review statute). The court of appeals noted that the
case included pendent state claims to which the information sought would also be relevant, but
determined "it would be meaningless to hold the communication privileged for one set of claims
and not the other .... [F]ederal law control[s] on the question of privilege in a federal antitrust
action, notwithstanding the presence of a pendent state claim." Id. at 1061 n.3 (citation omitted).
It is important to recognize that even though Shadur is on point, the case was decided before
HCQIA was enacted in 1986. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2006).
68 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001).
69 See id. at 285-86 (listing allegations of racial discrimination). Virmani also brought state
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Virmani argued that his employer treated non-Indian physicians differently
and disciplined them less harshly. 70 Guided by the Supreme Court's
decision in University of Pennsylvania, the court of appeals conducted a
Rule 501 analysis and declined to recognize a state evidentiary privilege for
peer-review documents where the discovery of such material was essential
for establishing the disparate treatment claim. 7'
C.

First CircuitPrecedent of the Privilege

Although the Virmani court failed to resolve the confusion
generated by federal courts' refusal to recognize or grant a state medical
peer-review privilege, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet taken a
stance on the issue.72
Some district courts within the circuit have
contemplated whether a state medical peer-review privilege applies in a
case asserting federal and state law claims; for instance, in Marshall v.
Spectrum Medical Group,73 the plaintiff brought a federal law claim
alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
and state law claims.74 The court relied on the framework outlined in In re
Hampers,75 in which the First Circuit adopted a "series of inquiries" for
courts to consider when balancing the interests of a state-afforded privilege
against federal disclosure. 76 In Marshall, the United States District Court
for the District of Maine evaluated whether a Maine state court would
recognize the peer-review privilege, which would satisfy the first aspect of
the Hampers test.77 In order to determine the merit of the state medical
peer-review privilege, the second part of the Hampers test, the court

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 286.
70 See id. at 285-86 (summarizing plaintiff's claim).
71 See id. at 288-89 (finding peer-review evidence crucial to establishing claim).
72 See Bennett v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254-55 (D.R.I. 2009); see
also Salamon, supra note 44, at 667, 669-70 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1996)) (explaining Virmani court failed to follow state trends under "reason and experience"
analysis).
73 198 F.R.D. 1 (D. Me. 2000).
74 Id. at 2. The plaintiff sought information from a third party, Eastern Maine Medical
Center, concerning his credentialing file and peer review. Id.
75 651 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1981).
76 See Afarshall, 198 F.R.D. at 3-5 (explaining Hampers framework); Hampers, 651 F.2d at
22 (describing balancing interests as "weighing the importance of the disclosure sought in the
federal prosecution against the potential injury caused a state by disclosure"); see also supra note
18 (outlining two-part Hampers test).
77 Marshall, 198 F.R.D. at 4.
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utilized "Wigmore's classic utilitarian formulation., 78 The Bennett court
more clearly explained Wigmore's four-prong analysis as:
[W]hether (1) the communications originated with the
expectation of nondisclosure; (2) confidentiality is
essential to maintaining the relationship between the
parties; (3) the relationship is vital and should be fostered;
and (4) "the injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications (would be) greater than
the benefit79 thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation. ,
Applying this standard, the court in Marshall compelled disclosure of the
material because the plaintiff alleged abuse within the peer-review process
itself; the proffered interests for applying the state privilege were lacking.8 0
The Marshall case is often cited for the proposition that courts
should refuse to enforce a state medical peer-review privilege in the federal
employment discrimination context. 81 Because the first aspect of the
Hampers test is satisfied by the fact that every state court within the First
Circuit's jurisdiction would apply a peer-review privilege, federal courts
typically rely on the second prong when deciding not to recognize the
privilege.8 2 Furthermore, the first three elements of the merit analysis are
78

See id. (citing ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981)).

79 Bennett v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 246, 253 (D.R.I. 2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting Hampers, 651 F.2d at 23).

8o See Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Grp., 198 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Me. 2000). The court stated,

"This case is not directly about the quality of patient care .... The articulated justification for
confidentiality in medical peer review matters is that patient care will suffer if a physician's
candid comments are subsequently used in malpractice or other cases to form a basis of liability."
Id.

81 See, e.g., Thayer v. E. Me. Med. Ctr., No. 1:09-CV-19-B-S, 2009 WL 1686673, at *2 (D.
Me. June 16, 2009); In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F. Supp.
2d 386, 391 (D. Mass. 2005); Krolikowski v. Univ. of Mass., 150 F. Supp. 2d 246, 248 (D. Mass.
2001); see also Sonnino v. Univ. Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 645 (D. Kan. 2004) (refusing
to apply state's medical peer-review privilege to a federal gender discrimination claim); Mattice
v. Mem'l Hosp. of S. Bend, 203 F.R.D. 381, 386 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (holding peer-review material
concerning anesthesiologist's ADA claim were not privileged).
82 See Scheutzow, supra note 25, at 9 (noting all states offer some type of protection to the
peer-review process). A state court reviewing whether peer-review documents are confidential
will look to see if they fall within the privilege on its face. See Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862
N.E.2d 11, 20 & n.16 (Mass. 2007) (holding certain memoranda, documents, minutes, and
correspondence were privileged); see also Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 858 (R.I. 1991)
(clarifying privilege applies only to records and proceedings of peer-review committees, not to
participants). "The aim of the inquiry is to determine whether the document was created by, or
otherwise as a result of a 'medical peer review committee."' Vranos, 862 N.E.2d at 20 n.16
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generally covered by the legislative intent of the state peer-review
statutes."3 Thus, the balancing between state interests promoting a
privilege and federal interests favoring disclosure is the essence of the
Hampers test.8 4 Federal district courts in Maine and Massachusetts have
concluded that peer-review material should be discoverable in the context
of sex discrimination claims as well as in cases alleging healthcare fraud.85
The courts were likely persuaded by the fact that the government could not
conduct an investigation without gaining access to statements made in the
peer review, documents
relied on in the peer-review process, or agreements
86
stemming from it.
When both federal and supplemental state claims are raised in the
complaint, and the former arises from the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), some federal courts have applied the
state's medical peer-review privilege.8 7 For instance, in Bennett, the court
determined that even though the peer-review report might be relevant to the
plaintiffs state tort action, a medical malpractice claim, state law would
not permit admittance; the court also extended the privilege to the
plaintiffs EMTALA claim.88 The district court reasoned that applying a

(citing Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1314 (Mass. 1998)).
83 See Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (discussing chapter 111, section 204(a)
of the Massachusetts General Laws in context of Hampers analysis); see also Smith v. Alice Peck
Day Mem'l Hosp., 148 F.R.D. 51, 55-56 (D.N.H. 1993) (focusing on fourth element in second
prong of Hamperstest to refuse recognizing state privilege).
84 Afarshall, 198 F.R.D. at 4; see Krolikowski, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 248-49 (assessing
fundamental purpose of privilege on one side and access to information on the other).
85 See Thayer, 2009 WL 1686673, at *2 (permitting discovery of evidence sought in
disparate treatment case stemming from medial peer review); Krolikowski, 150 F. Supp. 2d at
249-50 (recognizing "substantial costs of gender discrimination" weigh heavily on decision not to
apply privilege); Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (holding federal interest in
investigating and enforcing healthcare fraud outweighs state privilege interests).
86 See Thayer, 2009 WL 1686673, at *2; Krolikowski, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 249; see also Blue
Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 388, 392; In re Dep't of Justice Subpoena Baptist Mem'l
Hosp., No. 04-MC-018-DV, 2004 WL 2905391, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 22, 2004) (refusing to
recognize privilege in healthcare fraud case).
87 See Bennett v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 246, 253 (D.R.I. 2009); see also
Guzman v. Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., No. H-07-3973, 2009 WL 427268, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
20, 2009) (holding peer-review documents irrelevant to EMTALA claim and state privilege
applies to state claims). In Bennett, the plaintiff acted as the Administratrix of her mother's estate
and brought a medical negligence action. 623 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
88 Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 254-55. Since the peer-review report concerned the standards
of care provided to the plaintiff, it likely would not elicit whether she received disparate treatment
compared to other similarly situated patients to establish her EMTALA claim. Id. The court
noted that the crux of the plaintiff's case depended on the "alleged failure of the attending
physician to order a CAT scan during the decedent's initial visit to the Kent emergency room,"
which supported only a negligence claim and was thus protected by the state's peer-review
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claim-by-claim relevance approach was appropriate because it followed
Rule 501 and there is no binding authority addressing what privilege law
applies in a federal question case with supplemental state law claims.89
Therefore, if peer-review documents are relevant to both the federal and
state claims, then the documents at issue are not privileged because federal
privilege law controls, but when evidence is relevant only to the state
claim, state law provides the rule of decision and generally courts
recognize the state's medical peer-review privilege. 90
III. THE STANDARD FOR MEDICAL PEER-REVIEW IN FEDERAL
COURT
Proponents of the medical peer-review privilege fear that the trend
of non-recognition in federal courts will have a negative impact on the
effectiveness of the peer-review process. 91 A broad interpretation of the
decisions by federal appellate courts would support their concerns about

unrestricted access to peer-review information. 92 Alternatively, opponents
of the privilege argue that non-recognition of the privilege will act as a
check on physicians and institutions that perform peer review, especially
those without formal protocol to avoid potential bias within the
committee. 93
Critics also contend that there is a lack of evidence
confirming that peer review accomplishes its purported goal of improving
the quality of health care. 94 Despite varying opinions about the peer-review
process's effectiveness, hospital administrators, physicians, and nurses

privilege. Id. at 254.

89 See id. at 252-53; see also Guzman, 2009 WL 427268, at *5-6 (explaining Fifth Circuit
law and "claim-by-claim relevance approach").
90 See Guzman, 2009 WL 427268, at *7.
91 See Sharifi, supra note 10, at 584 (arguing plaintiffs could attach federal claims to

personal injury claims to invoke federal court jurisdiction). Similarly, federally -funded or
federally-operated physicians and institutions could face more obstacles if peer-review
information is not privileged in basic tort claims. See id. at 583-84; see also supra note 44 and
accompanying text (evaluating peer-review process in Veterans Administration Hospital).
92 See Sharifi, supra note 10, at 584.
93 See id. at 585; see also Hurney, Jr. et al., supra note 9, at 39-41 (listing ways to protect the
peer review process). Hurney, Jr. et al. suggest that organizations should create a peer-review
culture, ensure procedural due process, educate reviewers and support the process, determine if
outside peer review is appropriate, and document the process. Id. at 40-41. "An institution that
conducts a physician peer review should give the affected physician complete access to patient
records and to the specific criticisms against him or her, to make the process fair, compliant with
due process, and transparent." Id. at 39-40.
94 See Fine, supra note 5, at 827. But see Moore et al., supra note 21, at 1205-06 (arguing
empirical evidence suggests peer review helps physicians improve their patient complaint files).
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generally believe in the self-assessment tool and rely on the mechanism to
keep apprised of peer performance. 95 In weighing the various arguments,
this Note suggests that the First Circuit should address the confusion
stemming from inconsistent enforcement of the medical peer-review
privilege in federal courts by establishing that-except for a few specific
claims, which must pass a threshold inquiry-peer review records will be
protected in cases asserting both federal and state claims.96
A.

Lessons LearnedFrom FederalCases

It is evident that federal courts believe the interests in enforcing
laws against antitrust violations, employment discrimination, and fraud
outweigh any public policy benefits favoring a privilege for medical peer
reviews. 97 The Fourth Circuit in Virmani and Eleventh Circuit in Adkins
allowed disclosure of peer-review information because they were
persuaded that the race discrimination claims arose out of the process
itself.98 This outcome is proper because physicians who use the process for
economic gain or to discriminate against competent practitioners should not
be afforded protection.99 However, the peer-review mechanism is effective
when conducted in good faith. 1°O If physicians who engage in peer review

95 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Bassler, supra note 17, at 691-92
(describing evolution and purpose of peer review).
96 See Sharifi, supra note 10, at 592-93 (proposing judicial solution to preserving state

privilege protections while recognizing federal policy considerations).
97 See generally Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1331 (1 lth Cir. 2007) (denying privilege
in racial discrimination case); Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry Cnty. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063
(7th Cir. 1981) (denying privilege in antitrust case); In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386, 393 (D. Mass. 2005) (denying privilege in connection
with healthcare fraud case). "The Supreme Court has several times refused to recognize a
privilege when doing so would inhibit a federal investigation." Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F.
Supp. 2d at 392.
98 See Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329; Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 288-89 (4th
Cir. 2001); see also supra notes 62-66, 69-71 and accompanying text.
99 See Salamon, supra note 44, at 674. Furthermore, the Virmani court failed to follow state
trends recognizing the privilege and failed to guarantee a reliable peer review privilege that
"would be no substantial cost to federal policy ... because Congress has already approved federal
peer review privilege in other contexts .... Furthermore, consistent with many state statutes, the
court could allow disclosure when a physician challenges an adverse peer review outcome." See
id. at 670-71 & n. 179 (discussing laws that permit discovery where claims arise from peer-review
decisions affecting physicians' staff privileges).

100 See Mark D. Abruzzo, Peer Review May Not Be Confidential When Fairnessof Process
Is at Issue, TEE CENTER FOR PEER REV. JUST. (Nov. 1999), http://www.peerreview.org/

confidential.htm (reporting one doctor, "believes that doctors who misuse peer review and act in
bad faith should be sued") (emphasis added).
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understand that the material from the meetings will only be discoverable in
discrimination or anti-competition litigation, they will still feel comfortable
participating in and being honest about the performance of others.' 0'
Moreover, in cases of healthcare fraud, it is usually a third-party
hospital that invokes the privilege because prosecutors seek information
from the hospital's peer review for use against the physician who allegedly
engaged in fraudulent activity. 10 2 This situation differs from those where
the claim arises from the process because the alleged criminal fraud would
have occurred prior to the peer review.' 03 In this scenario, the government
would have access to other sources of admissible evidence to carry its
burden of proof, including the same material submitted to an internal
medical peer-review committee. 10 4 Therefore, the prosecution could only
have access to the contents of the peer review if it could satisfy an initial
burden to prove that the peer-review communications and reports were
relevant to the fraud investigation. 105 The purpose of the state privileges
does not conflict with the important government interests in prosecuting
fraudulent conduct, and thus courts have properly applied Rule 501 in this
06
context as well. 1
When federal courts apply federal common-law privileges to
federal and state claims, they are choosing to recognize "an amorphous
rule" of evidence while ignoring the Rule's guidance that "reason and
experience" means courts should consider states' proscribed purposes
behind legislative enactment of a privilege. 107 Whenever a federal question
claim is raised, federal courts have held that federal common law controls
any claim of privilege, and have not recognized a federal common-law
101See Sharifi, supra note 10, at 592.
102 See Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 387-89 (providing background facts and

stating court's only issue is whether to enforce subpoena).
103 See In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386,
387 (D. Mass. 2005) (stating action arose out of federal criminal investigation).
104 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:13-a(II) (2005) ("[I]nformation, documents, or records
otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or
use in any such civil or administrative action merely because they were presented to a quality
assurance program ... ").
105 See Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 392 ("[T]he government should not be
Hampered in its investigation so long as it shows the documents sought could likely be
relevant."). The Blue Cross Blue Shield court found that the documents the government sought
would "provide substantial assistance" in the government's investigation. See id.
106 See FED. R. EVID. 501; Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 392-93. The medical
peer-review privilege seeks to protect peer-review information from being used in "medical
malpractice litigation and litigation surrounding libel or slander." Sharifi, supra note 10, at 564.
107 See FED. R. EVID. 501; Bassler, supra note 17, at 702 (suggesting courts are not following
Rule 501 when refusing to recognize state privilege).
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medical peer-review privilege; however, the information discussed in a
peer-review process should not be disclosed simply because it has some
relevance in the litigation. 08 In Liu, for instance, the court stated that
HCQIA's lack of a privilege could not preempt the state law protection
provided in Alabama's peer-review statute. 0 9 In essence, the court allowed
the defendant to invoke the state privilege to refuse sending credentialing
files of a former employee to another institution, which the plaintiff argued
violated his federal rights. 110 Similar to the court's outcome in Liu, in other
cases, "such as medical malpractice and defamation actions, which do not
arise out of the peer-review process, the applicable state law will govern,
thus requiring the federal courts to apply state privilege laws."",,'
B.

The First CircuitShould Respond

Suppose that the Bennett petitioner appealed the district court's
decision to deny her motion to compel certain testimony, and the First
Circuit accepted further appellate review to address whether the lower
courts properly recognized a state's medical peer-review privilege.112 To
evaluate this issue the First Circuit would follow the two-part test adopted
in Hampers: (1) "whether the courts of [Rhode Island] would recognize
such a privilege," and (2) "whether the state's asserted privilege is
intrinsically meritorious," which is analyzed under Wigmore's four
criteria."' The court of appeals would likely determine Rhode Island has
the medical peer-review privilege, satisfying the first prong.114
recognized
Before considering the second prong, though, the court could go further by

108 Bassler, supra note 17, at 701.
109 See Ming Wei Liu v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 330 F. App'x 775, 779-80 (11th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1053 (2010). Although there were pendent state claims in that
case, the court declined to consider them once the federal claims were dismissed. Id. at 778 n.3.
110See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing court's reasoning for applying state
statute).
III Sharifi, supra note 10, at 588.
112 See Bennett v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 246, 250 (D.R.I. 2009)
(describing appellant's argument). Assuming plaintiff would raise the same issue on appeal to
the First Circuit, then "Bennett suggests that, because she has asserted a claim under the federal
EMTALA statute and neither federal common law nor federal statutory law recognize a 'peerreview privilege,' [the physician] should be compelled to respond to Bennett's deposition
questions." Id.
113 See In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 See Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 254. The district court stated: "Under [Rhode
Island's]
peer-review privilege, a hospital is entitled to withhold all records and proceedings before the
peer-review board ....

[T]he statutes creating the peer-review privilege are to be strictly

construed." Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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addressing the argument that a lack of uniformity among state statutes
supports non-recognition of the privilege in federal courts." 5 Since the
four state statutes within the First Circuit's boundaries are very similar to
one another, a model medical peer-review privilege might read as follows:
All proceedings, reports, and records of a medical peer-review committee
are privileged and confidential and therefore not subject to discovery or
subpoena, and are not admissible as evidence in any civil, judicial, or
administrative proceeding. 116
The First Circuit likely would review the issue by using a claimby-claim relevance approach." 7 In its reasoning for affirming the district
court's holding, the court of appeals could tackle the interest balancing that
is inherent in the second prong of the Hampers test." 8 In support of the
plaintiff s case, the court could consider the argument opposing assertion of
the privilege: "The American tort system is premised upon an ideology of
free flowing information that ultimately leads to just findings in any
particular case."" 9
District courts have a variety of mechanisms to ensure that many of
the documents sought under the peer-review privilege remain confidential,
including in-camera review, redaction of extraneous information, and
protective orders, while retaining the plaintiffs ability to access material
that will prove his or her claim. 120 In addition to the policy interests
promoting disclosure of requested peer-review information, critics of the
privilege often cite a lack of correlation between peer review and improved
healthcare quality. 121 However, empirical tools can measure quality of
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See Nijm, supra note 15, at 556; Salamon, supra note 44, at 669.

See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (quoting relevant sections of medical peerreview statutes for Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island).
117 See Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 254-55 (determining Rhode Island privilege applied to
federal claim); see also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing Guzman). The
First Circuit would likely agree with the court's reasoning that the information sought would be
irrelevant to the federal EMTALA claim, and since the essence of the case concerns medical
malpractice, the Rhode Island peer-review privilege protects the physician's testimony. See
Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 254-55.
118Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Grp., 198 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Me. 2000).
119 Fine, supra note 5, at 829. "[P]romoting liberal discovery policies at the expense of a peer
review privilege achieves the greater public good because, absent specific statutory language
otherwise, liberal discovery policies promote justice by allowing the juries an opportunity to hear
a more balanced 'truth."' Graham, supra note 27, at 139.
120 See Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Graham, supra
note 27, at 139. It might not even be necessary for the court to employ these protective options
when the peer-review information sought might already be discoverable, under some
circumstances, as a business record. See Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329.
121 Fine, supra note 5, at 827.
Fine argues that, "no exhaustive study has linked the
116
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care, and recent evidence suggests that the peer-review process
helps
12 2
physicians at high risk of malpractice claims learn from peers.
Federal courts' recognition of the privilege will alleviate the
practical concerns that inhibit physician participation in quality
management and assurance programs-primarily, the fear of personal
rejection by one's peers, financial loss from decreases in referrals, and civil
liability. 123 The need for physicians to evaluate peers without concern that
their candid assessments will be used against them is a public good
comparable to the Supreme Court's decision to protect the confidential
communications between a therapist and patient that foster successful
psychiatric treatment.124 In Virmani, the Fourth Circuit conducted the same
balancing test used in Jaffee and University of Pennsylvania to determine
that the interests in discrimination claims for disclosing evidence outweigh
the interests for protecting peer-review confidentiality. 125 The First Circuit,
in a hypothetical Bennett appeal, could differentiate its balancing analysis
from that in Virmani and University of Pennsylvania because Bennett's

federal EMTALA claim did not arise from the peer-review process and the
purposes for protecting peer review in health care are different than those
in the academic setting. 126 Hospitals are required to have risk management
practices in place and physicians are a critical part of the process; without
imposition of medical peer review statutes of any kind with a reduction in medical error
occurrences." Id.
122 See Moore et al., supra note 21, at 1205.
123 Fine, supra note 5, at 819 n.58.
124 See Salamon, supra note 44, at 655-56; see also Sharifi, supra note 10, at 579-80
(discussing Court's reasoning in Jaffee).
125 Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 287-93 (4th Cir. 2001); see Salamon, supra
note 44, at 665 & n. 148 (discussing balancing questions the Court analyzed in Jaffee and Univ. of
Pa.).
126 See Bennett v. Kent Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254-55 (D.R.I.
2009)
(noting plaintiff's claim focuses on inadequate care rather than improper peer review); see also
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 191-93 (1990) (refusing to accept university's argument for
creating a privilege against disclosure of peer-review materials). The Court reviewed Title VII's
legislative history to determine that tenure decisions should not be exempt from enforcement
procedures because the EEOC must be able to investigate if discrimination occurred in the peer
review. See id. at 191-92; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining court's
reasoning). Rhode Island's medical peer-review privilege protects the type of information sought
by the plaintiff for establishing both her federal EMTALA claim and state malpractice claims; in
this type of case, the defendant can cite to a consensus among the states to support that courts
should recognize the privilege whereas the University of Pennsylvania's argument for
establishing an academic peer-review privilege lacked persuasive justification. See Univ. of Pa.,
493 U.S. at 198-201 (relying on a favorable interpretation of Title VII or First Amendment right
to academic freedom); Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (applying Rhode Island's peer-review
statute); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing uniformity among states
concerning medical peer-review privilege).

224

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVI

peace of mind that these mechanisms will be protected in litigation,
participants are less likely to engage in peer review. 127
Furthermore, disclosing peer-review information may lead to a
resurgence of medical malpractice actions if plaintiffs circumvent state
protections by joining federal claims to personal injury lawsuits. 128 Despite
federal courts' hesitation to grant a blanket privilege, the inconsistencies in
the case law confuse those involved in peer review: "If the hospitals and
peer review committee members become too accustomed to expansive
[state] privileges, and then find that a federal question pulls them into
federal court, they will likely be ill-equipped to protect the integrity of their
review process.',' 129 Therefore, the First Circuit should send a clear
message to physicians and institutions performing peer review: When
conducted in good faith, peer-review records will be confidential and
privileged from discovery in any state or federal case unless the claim
arises out of the process itself or relates to the prosecution of healthcare
fraud. 3 °
In such a case where the complaint alleges employment
discrimination stemming from peer review, antitrust violations, or fraud,
the plaintiff or prosecution should have an initial burden to establish that
the information sought in discovery or by subpoena-i.e., that material
which is typically privileged by state law-will be relevant to proving the
federal claim. 3'
C.

Legislative Option: Amend HCQIA

An alternative to the First Circuit's judicial approach for resolving
federal courts' inconsistent application of the medical peer review privilege
is for Congress to amend HCQIA. 3 2 On the one hand, when the legislature

127

See Bassler, supra note 17, at 691-92 ("[T]he Joint Commission on Accreditation of

Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) . . . requires hospitals to have a continuing method to
evaluate physicians."); see also supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
enactment of confidentiality and privilege to encourage physician peer review).
128 See Sharifi, supra note 10, at 582-86 & n.141 (suggesting federal courts could disclose
peer-review information for state personal injury claims). A common law medical peer-review
privilege could help to alleviate forum shopping. Bassler, supra note 17, at 712.
129 Graham, supra note 27, at 130-31. "Unfortunately, the plethora of contradictory federal
district court decisions cannot be so easily reconciled." Id. at 138.
130 See Sharifi, supra note 10, at 592 (proposing judicial action); see also Graham, supra
note 27, at 139 (suggesting Supreme Court should address peer review under HCQIA).
131 See In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386,
392 (D. Mass. 2005) (noting government interests should not be "Hampered").
132 See Nijm, supra note 15, at 556 (calling on Congress to enact laws
establishing
uniformity in protections of peer-review process).
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enacted HCQIA, courts interpreted that it only granted immunity because
an explicit evidentiary privilege for peer-review material was omitted from
the statutory language. 3' Conversely, Congress could have simply decided
confidentiality protections were implicit in the law. 13 4 Courts chose to
fashion different methods of protection rather than follow the guidance of
state privileges.' 35 It seemed federal courts feared that these privileges
were too broad and would destroy a litigant's case; however, the
protections actually suppress very little information. 3 6 Under a new
HCQIA, Congress would clarify that federal courts are required to assess
whether the HCQIA privilege should apply to a specific piece of
discovery. 137
CONCLUSION
As the attorney representing a hospital's potential medical
malpractice defense, you must return your client's call and provide advice
on the matter. This Note has discussed the trend in federal courts to grant
disclosure of requested peer-review material and to refuse recognizing the
medical peer-review privilege when a federal claim arises directly from
that process. The First Circuit has not addressed the confusion that is
generated from state statutes' and state courts' broad protections for those
privileges compared to the narrow interpretation of federal common-law
privileges. Medical peer-review statutes give peace of mind to physicians
participating in peer reviews-individuals who are concerned about the
legal consequences of their actions. Physicians who act in good faith
during peer review and follow the proper procedures and state laws could
experience adverse consequences if they are unexpectedly subjected to
federal court jurisdiction.

133

See, e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 390-91 (stating Congress did not

create a federal evidentiary privilege); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys. -W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597,
602 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (discussing extent of HCQIA provisions); Syposs v. United States, 63 F.
Supp. 2d 301, 308 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting absence of privilege in HCQIA).
134 See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 291 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e cannot
conclude that Congress actually considered and rejected a privilege for medical review materials
when enacting the HCQIA ... ").
135 See Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (suggesting redaction,
incamera review, and protective orders as useful tools for protecting confidentiality); see also FED.
R. EVID. 501 (enabling federal courts to interpret principles of common law).
136 See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing minimal impact of peer-review
privilege on discovery).
137 See case cited supra note 33 and accompanying text (analyzing whether each discovery
request is privileged).
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Peer review is a well-established practice, as reflected by the
adoption of statutes in every state protecting it. The purpose of these laws
is to encourage candid conversations about the performance of other
practitioners, which leads to the overall improvement of quality health care.
If the First Circuit were to address whether the privilege should be
recognized federally, then it could determine that the interests favoring
disclosure of peer-review information do not outweigh the public factors.
With thousands of healthcare providers in the region, the First Circuit
might be more persuaded by "reason and experience" to heed the states'
message supporting a medical peer-review privilege. Despite the reforms
Congress implemented to achieve a more universal healthcare system, the
legislature seems to deny federal protection for one of the field's most
important mechanisms for ensuring the highest quality of care in the world.
Furthermore, the lobbying groups that act on behalf of medical doctors
might not fund politicians that ignore physicians' reasonable requests for
confidentiality in peer reviews.
While on the phone with your client, you will convey that the type
of information the plaintiff would seek likely only supports a state
malpractice claim, and that the peer-review discussion of the physician's
surgery should be protected since the patient's claim did not arise out of the
peer review. Ultimately, though, you will still feel uneasy about predicting
whether a federal court will apply the medical peer-review privilege to your
client's peer-review activities.

JaredM.Levin

